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UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP 
V. EPA:  
A SHOT ACROSS THE BOW OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
AMANDA C. LEITER 
INTRODUCTION 
In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection 
Agency (UARG),1 decided in June of this year, the Supreme Court 
reached a split decision on a pressing but arcane issue related to the 
scope of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) authority to 
regulate greenhouse gases. From the bench, Justice Scalia described 
his opinion for a shifting majority of the Court as, in essence, a win for 
the agency: “‘EPA is getting almost everything it wanted in this case,’” 
he said.2 “‘[The agency] sought to regulate sources it said were 
responsible for 86 percent of all the greenhouse gases emitted from 
stationary sources nationwide. Under our holdings, [it] will be able to 
regulate sources responsible for 83 percent of those emissions.’”3 
Some in the press accepted Scalia’s characterization, while others 
emphasized the partial nature of the victory. Sample headlines include 
Justices Uphold Emission Limits on Big Industry4 and Supreme Court 
Upholds Rules Curbing Greenhouse Gases from Power Plants,5 but 
also Supreme Court Limits Greenhouse Gas Regulations.6 
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 1.  Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) [hereinafter UARG]. 
 2.  Robert Barnes, Supreme Court: EPA Can Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions, with 
Some Limits, WASH. POST, June 24, 2014, at A1 (quoting Justice Scalia’s bench statement). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Adam Liptak, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2014, at A1. 
 5.  David G. Savage, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2014, at A1. 
 6.  Richard Wolf, USA TODAY, June 23, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
nation/2014/06/23/supreme-court-greenhouse-gas/8567453/. 
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The first two headlines are more accurate than the third. The 
trajectory of the UARG case, and the opinion itself, preserve (even 
bolster) EPA’s authority to curb greenhouse gas emissions from the 
largest industrial sources. That outcome should be welcomed by 
anyone concerned about mitigating the serious environmental, public 
health, and national security risks of global climate change. 
That said, other aspects of the UARG opinion should trouble 
anyone concerned about Supreme Court jurisprudence or judicial 
deference to agency authority. For one thing, the stakes in statutory 
interpretation cases such as UARG are quite high at present, because 
our deeply divided Congress seems less likely than past Congresses to 
“intervene[] to correct . . . wayward”7 Supreme Court interpretations.8 
Yet part of the UARG decision plays fast-and-loose with the statutory 
text, throwing interpretive caution to the winds. 
Another portion of the opinion creates a presumption against 
reading ambiguous statutory text to grant agencies authority that is 
either “too expansive” or “too expensive.”9 The problem? There is no 
objective way to measure whether a delegation conveys authority that 
is overly expansive or overly expensive. Moreover, no such anti-
delegation presumption previously existed. Indeed, just last year in 
City of Arlington v. FCC, Justice Scalia himself invoked the 
opposite—and more commonly accepted–rule: “Congress knows to 
speak in plain terms when it wishes to circumscribe, and in capacious 
terms when it wishes to enlarge, agency discretion.”10 
 
 
 7.  Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2466 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 8.  Indeed, the authors of two recent—and divergent—studies of congressional overrides 
apparently agree that since at least 1998, Congress’s participation in this important inter-branch 
dialogue has declined “dramatically.” Compare Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 
1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2014), (arguing that the 1990s was “the golden age of 
overrides, with an unprecedented explosion of statutes resetting statutory policy in important 
ways,” but that after 1998, “overrides declined . . . dramatically”), with Richard L. Hasen, End 
of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 
205, 217 (2013) (“[C]ongressional overruling of Supreme Court cases [has] slowed down 
dramatically since 1991”).  
 9.  Justin Pidot, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA: Climate Litigation and Statutory 
Construction, ACSBLOG (June 24, 2014), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/utility-air-regulatory-
group-v-epa-climate-litigation-and-statutory-construction. Pidot’s observation relates to Justice 
Scalia’s assertion that the Court “expect[s] Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an 
agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’” UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 
(2014) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)). 
 10.  City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) (emphasis added). 
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Worse, by inventing this previously nonexistent interpretive 
presumption, the UARG opinion not only risks misinterpreting 
Congress’s intent, but undermines the separation of powers principle 
that: “‘Congress, when it [leaves] ambiguity in a statute’ administered 
by an agency, ‘underst[ands] that the ambiguity [will] be resolved, first 
and foremost, by the agency, and desire[s] the agency (rather than the 
courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity 
allows.’”11 
The Court reminded readers of this very presumption in EPA v. 
EME Homer City Generation, issued just two months before UARG: 
“[u]nder Chevron, we read Congress’ silence [on a contested matter] 
as a delegation of authority to EPA to select from among reasonable 
options.”12 Moreover, in City of Arlington, Justice Scalia confirmed 
that this principle applies with full force even when—as in UARG—
the statutory ambiguity goes to the scope of the agency’s own 
authority.13 Yet the UARG opinion neither defers to the agency’s 
reading of the relevant statutory language nor remands the resulting 
mess to the agency to try again. Instead, the opinion imposes its own 
reading, thereby taking judicial “possess[ion of] whatever degree of 
discretion the ambiguity allows.” 
In several ways, the opinion also runs afoul of notions of judicial 
restraint. Most egregiously, although the Court limited its grant of 
certiorari to a single narrow question, the opinion resolves at least 
two other questions that the parties had posed but the Court had 
declined to review—and that the parties therefore had not briefed. 
Further, the opinion fails to give EPA adequate guidance about 
appropriate next steps. Portions of the challenged regulations are 
invalid, but it is not clear whether the remaining portions can be 
salvaged, or whether the agency must return to its rulemaking 
drawing board. 
In short, the UARG opinion muddles previously well-understood 
principles of statutory interpretation and undermines agency 
authority, and it also reaches out to decide or comment on, issues that 
were not properly before the Court. The press may have had some 
difficulty identifying a clear winner in this case, but the clear losers 
are the Court and the administrative state. 
 
 11.  Id. (quoting Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740–741 (1996)). 
 12.  EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1604 (2014).  
 13.  See City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868 (parenthetical needed). 
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I.   BACKGROUND 
A.  Setting the Scene 
To understand the outcome of UARG and see the shortcomings of 
the Court’s opinion, one must have some background on relevant 
portions of the Clean Air Act.14 As passed in 1970 and amended 
several times since then,15 the Act gives both EPA and the states a role 
in reducing air pollution. Specifically, EPA sets national air quality 
standards for a set of common pollutants (dubbed “criteria 
pollutants”):16 particulate matter, ozone, carbon monoxide, sulfur 
oxides, nitrogen oxides, and lead.17 This list does not currently include 
the most common greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide.18 The Act then 
turns over much of the responsibility for achieving and maintaining 
these national standards to the states, which must develop 
implementation plans identifying the specific emissions control 
requirements on which each state plans to rely.19 
Superimposed on that broad structure are several narrower 
programs to control emissions of a variety of air pollutants, including 
but not limited to the six criteria pollutants listed above. Three such 
programs are relevant here:20 
 The Tailpipe Program: A broad federal program to regulate the 
tailpipe emissions of any air pollutant that the EPA Administrator 
determines contributes to air pollution that “may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”;21 
 
 14.  42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401–7671 (West 2014). 
 15.  Clean Air Act §§ 101–618, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401–7642 (West 2014), amended by 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 7402–7671g (West 2014). 
 16.  42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7408–7409 (West 2014). 
 17.  ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS (NAAQS), 
EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/air/criteria.html (last updated Oct. 21, 2014).  
 18.  The Center for Biological Diversity has, however, petitioned the agency to list carbon 
dioxide as a criteria pollutant. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, PETITION TO ESTABLISH 
NATIONAL POLLUTION LIMITS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES PURSUANT TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
(2009), available at, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/ 
global_warming_litigation/clean_air_act/pdfs/Petition_GHG_pollution_cap_12-2-2009.pdf. 
 19.  42 U.S.C.A. § 7410 (West 2014). 
 20.  To simplify the discussion, this Article ignores Petitioners’ challenge to the Title V 
program, focusing instead on their challenge to the PSD permitting program. “Title V generally 
does not impose any substantive pollution-control requirements,” instead serving primarily “to 
facilitate compliance and enforcement by consolidating into a single document all of a facility’s 
obligations under the Act.” UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2436 (2014). Moreover, the Court’s analysis 
of the legal issues related to the Title V program largely parallels its analysis of the PSD 
Program. 
 21.  42 U.S.C.A. § 7521(a)(1) (West 2014). 
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 The Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD)22 Program: A 
permitting scheme for large new stationary (that is, non-mobile) 
sources that will emit specific amounts of “any air pollutant” 
already subject to regulation under the Act,23 and for large existing 
stationary sources that are undertaking major modifications that 
will increase their emissions of “any air pollutant” that is already 
subject to regulation under the Act;24 and 
 The NSPS Program: A regulatory program to reduce emissions 
from whole categories of stationary sources that “cause[], or 
contribute[] significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”25 
In creating these pollution control programs, Congress did not 
attempt to anticipate every air pollution problem that might confront 
the country as the economy grew and new industries developed. 
Rather, in both the tailpipe and NSPS programs, Congress granted 
EPA broad authority to respond to new and newly recognized air-
pollution problems that the Administrator determines “may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”26 The 
agency terms this determination an “endangerment finding.”27 
 
 
 22.  The PSD Program is actually a sub-programs of the broader “new source review,” or 
NSR, permitting program. There is also another sub-program, the so-called nonattainment new 
source review, or NNSR, permitting program. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7502(b), 7503. Applicability of the 
PSD and NNSR programs depends on the air quality of the region in question. For purposes of 
this Paper, the only relevant sub-program is the PSD Program, which applies to (1) those 
criteria pollutants whose levels in the relevant area do not exceed the national air quality 
standards (or NAAQS), and (2) other pollutants for which there is no NAAQS. See, e.g., 
ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY, Region 9 Air Permits, EPA.GOV, 
http://www.epa.gov/region9/air/permit/psd-public-part.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2015) 
(describing the PSD Program); Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse 
Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,520 (June 3, 2010) (describing the PSD and NNSR 
programs and noting that “[t]here is no NAAQS for [carbon dioxide] or any of the other well-
mixed [greenhouse gases], nor has EPA proposed any such NAAQS; therefore, unless and until 
we take further such action, we do not anticipate that the nonattainment NSR program will 
apply to [greenhouse gases]”).To simplify the discussion, the remainder of the Paper discusses 
only the PSD Program, ignoring other aspects of the NSR permitting regime. 
 23.  42 U.S.C.A. § 7475 (describing permitting program); § 7479(1) (defining “major 
emitting facility”). 
 24.  Id. at § 7475 (describing permitting program); § 7479(1) (defining “major emitting 
facility”); § 7479(2)(C) (defining “construction”). 
 25.  Id. at § 7411(b)(1)(A). 
 26.  Id. at § 7521(a)(1) (motor vehicle emissions); § 7411(b)(1)(A) (stationary sources). 
 27.  See, e.g., Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. Ch. 1) (making such a determination for greenhouse gases). 
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Further, these various emissions control programs do not operate 
in isolation. They are designed—somewhat clumsily—to work in 
tandem. The states and the federal government have the authority 
and the obligation to regulate major sources of any air pollutant that 
the EPA Administrator deems dangerous. In effect, a finding that a 
particular pollutant contributes to pollution that poses risks to human 
health or welfare triggers a regulatory cascade: EPA must regulate 
that pollutant under the Tailpipe and NSPS Programs, which in turn 
triggers the source-by-source permitting obligations of the PSD 
Program.28 
In two decisions that predate UARG, Massachusetts v. EPA29 and 
American Electric Power v. Connecticut (AEP),30 the Supreme Court 
recognized that the protections of the Clean Air Act extend to the 
increasingly certain and serious risks of climate change. The timeline 
is somewhat complicated. In its 2007 decision in Massachusetts, the 
Court noted that the Act’s “sweeping definition of ‘air pollutant,’” 
clearly and unambiguously “embraces all airborne compounds of 
whatever stripe,” including greenhouse gases,31 provided only that the 
Administrator makes the required “endangerment finding.”32 In 2009, 
the agency responded to Massachusetts by making such a finding, and 
committing to regulate tailpipe emissions of greenhouse gases.33 
Shortly thereafter in 2010 and 2011, the agency followed through and 
released rules regulating the emissions of greenhouse gases from 
 
 28.  Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered 
by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004, 17,007 (Apr. 2, 2010) (describing 
EPA’s view that the phrase “pollutant subject to regulation” in the statutory language defining 
the scope of the PSD Program “means a pollutant subject to a provision in the [Clean Air Act] 
or a regulation issued by EPA under the Act that requires actual control of emissions of that 
pollutant,” and thus that the PSD Program is triggered whenever “(1) the EPA promulgate[s] 
regulations requiring control of a particular pollutants on the basis of considered judgment, 
taking into account the applicable criteria in the CAA, or (2) EPA promulgates regulations on 
the basis of Congressional mandate that EPA establish controls on emissions of a particular 
pollutant, or (3) Congress itself directly imposes actual controls on emissions of a particular 
pollutant”). 
 29.  549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 30.  131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
 31.  Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 529, 532. 
 32.  Id. at 532–33 (noting that the Clean Air Act expressly conditions EPA action on the 
agency’s “formation of a ‘judgment[’] . . . relate[d] to whether an air pollutant ‘cause[s], or 
contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or 
welfare’” (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521(a)(1))). 
 33.  See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. Ch. 1) (finding that greenhouse gases do pose a risk to human health and welfare). 
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cars34 and trucks.35 Further, the agency pledged to take the next steps: 
regulating greenhouse gases from major stationary sources via the 
PSD permitting program36 and the NSPS program.37 Finally, also in 
2011, the Supreme Court referenced the agency’s various regulatory 
actions and commitments when it held in AEP38 that some 
combination of the Clean Air Act itself and the EPA action 
authorized by the Act displaced the Respondents’ “federal common 
law public nuisance claims against carbon-dioxide emitters.”39 In other 
words, the AEP Court identified EPA’s statutory authority to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources as grounds to 
prevent Respondents from pursuing their common law claims against 
those emitters. 
In sum, the Court issued its UARG decision against a background 
understanding that the Clean Air Act grants EPA authority to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions, not only from tailpipes, but also 
from stationary industrial sources via the PSD and NSPS programs. 
B.  The Lead-Up to UARG 
The question in UARG concerned the shape and scope of the 
agency’s effort to implement the PSD permitting program for 
greenhouse gases. Following its longstanding interpretation of the 
Clean Air Act,40 EPA took the position that (1) the agency’s 
 
 34.  See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (regulating light duty vehicles). 
 35.  Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and 
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,106 (Sept. 15, 2011) (regulating medium and 
heavy duty vehicles); see also Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (regulating 
lighter trucks). 
 36.  Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered 
by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004, 17,007 (Apr. 2, 2010) (determining 
that PSD Program requirements apply to greenhouse gases emitted from stationary sources as 
of the effective date of the tailpipe regulations for greenhouse gas emission from light duty 
vehicles). 
 37.  Notice of Proposed Settlement Agreement; Request for Public Comment, 75 Fed. 
Reg., 82,392, 82,392 (Dec. 30, 2010) (proposing to reach a settlement agreement in pending D.C. 
Circuit litigation, under which EPA would “sign by July 26, 2011 . . . a proposed rule under 
[Clean Air Act] section 111(b) that includes standards of performance for [greenhouse gases] 
for new and modified [electricity generating units]”); see also Clean Air Act § 111(d)(1), 42 
U.S.C.A. § 7411(d)(1) (West 2014) (triggering a requirement that States set standards for 
existing sources “to which [an NSPS] standard of performance would apply if such existing 
sources were a new source”). 
 38.  Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2011). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Brief for the Federal Respondents at 9–10, UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (No. 12-
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regulation of the tailpipe emissions of greenhouse gases automatically 
triggered the PSD Permitting Program,41 and (2) the PSD Program, in 
turn, obligated both new and modified “major” stationary sources to 
obtain greenhouse gas emissions permits, and to comply with the 
associated—and fairly rigorous and expensive—emissions control 
requirements.42 The agency ran into a significant obstacle, however, 
when it confronted the Clean Air Act language defining which 
facilities are sufficiently “major” to be covered by the PSD Program. 
For greenhouse gases, the language is overbroad. 
This overbreadth is not a drafting error. It is a consequence, 
rather, of the Clean Air Act’s age and the nature of climate pollution. 
When Congress wrote the Act, “the study of climate change was in its 
infancy.”43 Congress had in mind more familiar pollutants—
compounds such as sulfur dioxide, emitted as byproducts of 
combustion. Drafters targeted the largest industrial sources of those 
pollutants but let smaller sources continue to operate without a 
permit. Specifically, under the Act, the PSD Program extends only to 
“major” stationary sources that emit more than 250—or, for some 
sources, 100—tons per year of the regulated pollutant.44 
The 250 and 100 tons-per-year statutory thresholds generally work 
well for traditional pollutants. Only the most significant stationary 
sources, such as fossil-fuel-fired power plants, emit more than the 
threshold amount of criteria pollutants like sulfur dioxide, and thus 
find themselves subject to PSD permitting and pollution control 
requirements. But the most common greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, 
is not a trace pollutant but the inevitable end product of almost all 
 
1146) [hereinafter Brief for Federal Respondents] (“Since the earliest days of the PSD program, 
the EPA has concluded that, once a pollutant becomes regulated under the Act (as greenhouse 
gases now are under Title II), two related but distinct consequences follow automatically under 
the PSD program. First, going forward, the PSD program [applies to] any stationary source that 
emits large quantities of that newly regulated pollutant. . . [and s]econd, all proposed facilities to 
which the PSD program applies must take certain steps with respect to that newly regulated 
pollutant.”). 
 41.  See Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants 
Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004, 17,007 (Apr. 2, 2010). 
 42.  For example, permitted sources are required to install the “best available control 
technology” for all regulated pollutants. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7475(a)(4) (West 2014). The statute 
elsewhere defines “best available control technology” as “an emission limitation based on the 
maximum degree of reduction of each pollutants subject to regulation under this chapter . . . 
which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis . . . determines is achievable for such 
facility.” Id. at § 7479(3). 
 43.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 507 (2007). 
 44.  42 U.S.C.A. § 7475 (requiring preconstruction permits for “major emitting facilities”); 
§ 7479(1) (defining “major emitting facility”). 
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combustion. As a result, EPA projected that applying the PSD 
thresholds to stationary sources of greenhouse gases would bring tens 
of thousands of additional sources under the agency’s PSD umbrella,45 
impose hundreds of millions of additional dollars in permitting costs,46 
and result in “a volume of permit applications that is so high that the 
[PSD Program] would become impossible for State and Federal 
authorities to administer. The PSD . . . permitting processes would 
become overwhelmed and essentially paralyzed.”47 
As a temporary solution to this implementation conundrum, EPA 
promulgated something it dubiously nicknamed a “Tailoring Rule.” 
This rule purported to elevate by several orders of magnitude the 
triggering threshold for application of the PSD Program to 
greenhouse gas sources, so as to continue to target only the largest 
and most egregious sources.48 EPA emphasized that it did not intend 
this “tailoring” of the statutory thresholds to be a permanent solution 
but rather a short-term fix—a phase-in of the permitting 
requirements.49 Indeed, EPA pledged to conduct future rulemakings 
to address greenhouse gas emissions from sources whose emissions 
fell between the statutory triggering thresholds and the Tailoring 
Rule’s elevated thresholds.50 
This promise of a phase-in did not, however, insulate the Tailoring 
Rule (or the rest of EPA’s greenhouse gas regulations) from judicial 
challenge. Questioning both the agency’s legal interpretations and its 
fact-finding, various industry players and some States challenged 
every aspect of EPA’s permitting program for greenhouse gas sources. 
Their claims covered everything from the original endangerment 
finding, to the Tailpipe Rule for cars and light trucks, to the theory 
 
 45.  Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,295 (proposed Oct. 27. 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 
& 71) (“[T]o apply the statutory PSD and title V applicability thresholds to sources of GHG 
emissions would bring tens of thousands of small sources and modifications into the PSD 
Program each year.”). 
 46.  Id. at 55,301 (“[T]he additional annual permitting burden for permitting authorities, on 
a national basis, is estimated to be 3.3 million hours at a cost of $257 million to include all 
[greenhouse gas] emitters above the 250-[tons-per-year] threshold.”). 
 47.  Id. at 55,311. 
 48.  Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,517 (June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, & 71). 
 49. Id. at 31,516 (“EPA is establishing with this rulemaking a phase-in approach for [PSD] 
applicability, and is establishing the first two steps of the phase-in for the largest emitters of 
[greenhouse gases]. We also commit to certain follow-up actions regarding future steps beyond 
the first two.”). 
 50.  Id. 
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that the Tailpipe Rule triggered application of the PSD Program, and 
the details of the resulting Tailoring Rule. In all, challengers filed close 
to one hundred cases in the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit.51 
At first, the agency successfully fended off these challenges. The 
D.C. Circuit consolidated all of the cases and issued a per curiam 
ruling that was very favorable to the agency. Specifically, the court 
upheld both the endangerment finding and the Tailpipe Rule for cars 
and light trucks;52 agreed with EPA that its regulation of tailpipe 
emissions of greenhouse gases triggered PSD obligations for all major 
stationary sources of those emissions;53 and concluded that no 
petitioner had standing to challenge the Tailoring Rule because its 
function was “actually [to] mitigate Petitioners’ purported injuries.”54 
That brings us, finally, to the Supreme Court case. Numerous 
challengers sought certiorari from the D.C. Circuit decision, proposing 
a broad range of possible “questions presented,” including six that are 
relevant to this discussion: 
1. Whether the Court should reconsider its 2007 determination in 
Massachusetts v. EPA that the Clean Air Act extends to the 
regulation of greenhouse gases;55 
2. Whether EPA’s finding that greenhouse gases endanger human 
health and welfare was both procedurally and substantively 
sound;56 
3. Whether the agency correctly concluded that its regulation of 
tailpipe emissions automatically triggered PSD permitting 
requirements for stationary sources of greenhouse gases;57 
4. More generally, whether the agency correctly concluded that the 
PSD Program applies to major stationary sources of greenhouse 
 
 51.  Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part sub nom. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (consolidating cases). 
 52.  Id. at 317. 
 53.  Id. at 340. 
 54.  Id. at 317, 350. 
 55.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Texas v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (No. 12-1146) 
[hereinafter Texas Certiorari Petition]. The petitions for certiorari cited in footnotes 56–61 are 
petitions by separate parties in the individual cases consolidated by the Supreme Court to 
become the UARG opinion.  
 56.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Virginia v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (No. 12-
1152). 
 57.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. EPA, 134 S. 
Ct. 2427 (2014) (No. 12-1272). 
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gases, or whether the program should instead be limited only to 
sources of the six common criteria pollutants;58 
5. Whether the D.C. Circuit erred in holding that no petitioner had 
standing to challenge the Tailoring Rule;59 and finally, 
6. Whether the Tailoring Rule violated the Clean Air Act by 
rewriting the triggering standards of the PSD Program, and 
sharply narrowing its application to stationary sources of 
greenhouse gases.60 
Again, though, the agency fared reasonably well. Although the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari, it limited its grant to a single, quite 
narrow question presented, and its ultimate merits decision was 
reasonably favorable to the agency.61 
II.  THE UARG DECISION – THREE IMPORTANT VICTORIES FOR THE 
AGENCY 
A.  Victory #1 
As noted, EPA’s first victory in connection with the Supreme 
Court case came with the Court’s grant of certiorari. Although the 
Agency opposed certiorari,62 the narrowness of the grant amounted to 
a significant win for EPA. Specifically, as relevant here, the Court 
declined to consider questions one through five above, instead 
focusing its attention on a single narrow issue, related but not 
identical to question six: “[w]hether EPA permissibly determined that 
its regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles 
triggered [PSD] permitting requirements . . . for stationary sources 
that emit greenhouse gases.”63 In other words, the Court declined 
either to reconsider its determination, in Massachusetts v. EPA, that 
the Clean Air Act extends to greenhouse gases,64 or to disturb the D.C. 
Circuit’s twin holdings that EPA (1) reasonably concluded those gases 
 
 58.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Am. Chem. Council v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 
(2014) (No. 12-1248). 
 59.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Util. Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 
2427 (2014) (No. 12-1146). 
 60.  Texas Certiorari Petition, supra note 55, at i. 
 61.  See infra at Part II. 
 62.  See Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition at 18, UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427 
(2014) (No. 12-1146) [hereinafter Federal Opposition Brief]. 
 63.  Util. Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 418, 418 (2013) (order granting 
certiorari). 
 64.  Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 528–32 (2007). 
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contribute to air pollution that endangers human health and welfare;65 
and (2) followed required procedures and acted reasonably in 
regulating the tailpipe emissions of those gases.66 As a result, the case 
posed only a narrow and well-cabined risk to EPA’s authority to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions and to the President’s broader 
climate agenda.67 
B.  Victory #2 
The agency’s second victory, too, related to the fate of 
Massachusetts v. EPA. Even though the Court declined to accept 
certiorari on the question of that case’s continued validity, there 
remained a possibility that the four Massachusetts dissenters—Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—would pen or 
join opinions expressing their continued skepticism that the Clean Air 
Act extends to greenhouse gas emissions. In the end, though, only 
Justices Thomas and Alito expressed that skepticism,68 indicating that 
“seven of the Justices now view the issues decided in [Massachusetts] 
as settled.”69 
C.  Victory #3 
Explaining the third, more technical agency victory requires some 
background on the structure, analysis, and holdings of the Court’s 
opinion in UARG. Justice Scalia wrote for the Court, though only two 
justices—Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy—agreed with 
both halves of the bifurcated decision.70 Justices Thomas and Alito 
joined the first half of the opinion, to create a five-Justice majority 
(Majority A), while Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan 





 65.  Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 113, 116–26 (upholding the 
endangerment finding). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  See generally Energy, Climate Change, and Our President, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
 68.  UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2455 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I believed Massachusetts v. 
EPA was wrongly decided at the time, and these cases further expose the flaws with that 
decision.”). 
 69.  Pidot, supra note 9. 
 70.  UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2432. 
 71.  Id. 
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The first half of the opinion (Parts I, II–A, and II–B–1) begins 
with some background on Clean Air Act stationary source permitting 
and the history of EPA’s greenhouse gas regulation. This half 
addresses two legal questions. First, in a discussion modeled on the 
traditional Chevron step one,72 the Court asked whether the Clean Air 
Act’s unambiguous language compels EPA to conclude that 
greenhouse-gas regulation under the Tailpipe Program automatically 
triggers the PSD Program with respect to major stationary sources of 
those gases—a linkage that the Court termed a “greenhouse-gas-
inclusive interpretation.”73 Second, the Court asked a question that 
more closely resembles the traditional Chevron step two74: if the Act 
does not unambiguously compel a greenhouse-gas-inclusive 
interpretation, does the Act’s “ambiguous . . . text”75 nevertheless 
leave interpretive room for the agency to adopt such an 
interpretation? Majority A answered both questions in the negative. 
1.  Part II-A-1  
On the first question, Majority A concluded that although the Act 
requires PSD permits for “major emitters of ‘any air pollutant,’” and 
(under Massachusetts) the “general, Act-wide definition” of the term 
“‘air pollutant’ includes greenhouse gases,”76 the statutory language is 
nevertheless sufficiently broad, and the various pollution control 
programs sufficiently varied, to permit the agency to adopt a narrower 
definition of “air pollutant” for some programs than for others.77 As 
Justice Scalia explained, “the presumption of consistent usage [of a 
term in a statute] ‘readily yields’ to context, and a statutory term—
even one defined in the statute—‘may take on distinct characters 
 
 72.  See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 54, 52 
(2011) (describing the first step of the traditional two-step analysis under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), as requiring the Court to “ask 
whether Congress has ‘directly addressed the precise question at issue’”). 
 73.  UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2439–42 (Part II-A-1). 
 74.  See, e.g., Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 54 (describing the second step of the Chevron test 
as requiring the Court to leave in place “an agency rule unless it is ‘arbitrary or capricious in 
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute’”). 
 75.  UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444. 
 76.  Id. at 2439 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 7479(1) (West 2014) (defining “major emitting 
facility”)). 
 77.  Id. at 2442 (“In sum, there is no insuperable textual barrier to EPA’s interpreting ‘any 
air pollutant’ in the permitting triggers of PSD . . . to encompass only pollutants emitted in 
quantities that enable them to be sensibly regulated at the statutory thresholds, and to exclude 
those atypical pollutants that, like greenhouse gases, are emitted in such vast quantities that 
their inclusion would radically transform those programs and render them unworkable as 
written.”) 
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from association with distinct statutory objects calling for different 
implementation strategies.’”78 
Thus, in Majority A’s view, the Clean Air Act does not compel 
EPA to adopt a greenhouse gas-inclusive interpretation. Rather, the 
Act allows for the possibility that even after EPA regulates a 
particular kind of pollutant under the Tailpipe Program, major 
stationary sources of that pollutant may nevertheless escape 
regulation under the PSD program. Put more simply, Majority A 
decoupled the Tailpipe and PSD Programs for greenhouse gases. The 
fact that tailpipe emissions of greenhouse gases are regulated under 
the Tailpipe Program does not automatically obligate all major 
stationary sources of greenhouse gases to obtain PSD permits. 
2.  Part II-A-2  
On the second question, Majority A went one step further and 
concluded that in fact, the language and structure of the Act not only 
do not require the EPA to adopt a fully greenhouse gas-inclusive 
interpretation, but do not permit EPA to adopt that interpretation. 
This portion of the opinion focused on the problem EPA had tried to 
resolve with its Tailoring Rule—the mismatch between the low PSD 
triggering thresholds and the high levels of many sources’ greenhouse 
gas emissions. Majority A noted the impossibility of extending the 
PSD permitting program to all “major” stationary sources whose 
greenhouse gas emissions exceed the statutory thresholds: such an 
extension would “place plainly excessive demands on limited 
governmental [permitting] resources” and “bring about an enormous 
and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority.”79 And 
Majority A found no “clear congressional authorization” to adopt 
such a costly and “expansive” interpretation.80 
3.  Part II-A-3  
Finally—and somewhat surprisingly given the narrow grant of 
certiorari—Majority A turned its attention to the Tailoring Rule and 
conducted a third statutory-interpretation exercise. Specifically, 
Justice Scalia explained that the agency had no room to solve the 
problem of statutory fit by “tailoring” the PSD Program’s statutory 
thresholds. Those numerical thresholds are clear and unambiguous; 
 
 78.  Id. at 2441 (quoting Envt’l. Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007)). 
 79.  Id. at 2444. 
 80.  Id. 
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“[w]hen EPA replaced [them] with others of its own choosing, it went 
well beyond the ‘bounds of its statutory authority.’”81 
To summarize, three holdings emerge from the first half of the 
UARG opinion. First, the Clean Air Act does not require application 
of the PSD Program to all sources whose emissions of pollutants 
regulated under the Tailpipe Program exceed the PSD triggering 
thresholds. Second, the Act does not permit application of the full 
PSD Program to pollutants like greenhouse gases, which are 
commonly emitted at levels vastly exceeding the PSD triggering 
thresholds. Third, the Act expressly prohibits EPA from tailoring the 
PSD Program in the manner the agency had tried—by exempting less 
significant sources of such pollutants. 
The only question remaining for resolution was whether, despite 
Majority A’s conclusions, EPA nevertheless had authority to tailor the 
PSD Program in some other way. That is, although the Clean Air Act 
does not permit EPA to rewrite the PSD Program’s quantitative 
triggering thresholds for major stationary sources, can the agency 
nevertheless apply the Program’s emissions-control requirements to 
some otherwise-defined subset of stationary sources of greenhouse 
gas? 
4.  Part II-A-3  
In the second half of Justice Scalia’s opinion, Majority B accepted 
a line of argument from EPA’s merits brief82 and sided with the agency 
on this final question. Per Majority A, stationary sources need not 
obtain PSD permits merely because they emit greenhouse gases at 
levels above the PSD triggering thresholds; but those sources that 
must obtain PSD permits because of their threshold-exceeding 
emissions of other, conventional pollutants—so-called “anyway 
sources”83—must also ensure that their greenhouse gas emissions 
satisfy the PSD Program’s strict emissions control requirements.84 
Thus, while EPA lacks authority to modify the PSD triggers, it has 
ample authority to require that sources already within the PSD 
Program because of their emissions of other pollutants take on the 
 
 81.  Id. at 2445 (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013)). 
 82.  Federal Opposition Brief, supra note 62 at 24–28, (arguing that “the PSD program’s 
substantive requirements . . . apply to greenhouse-gas emissions from stationary sources that are 
covered by the program, including sources that are subject to the program because of their non-
greenhouse-gas . . . emissions”). 
 83.  UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2437 (defining “anyway sources”). 
 84.  Id. at 2448–49 (outlining the holding with respect to “anyway sources”).  
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extra obligation of controlling their greenhouse gas emissions.85 
D.  “EPA [got] almost everything it wanted” 
The strange bifurcated nature of the UARG opinion accounts for 
Justice Scalia’s characterization of the decision from the bench: “‘EPA 
[got] almost everything it wanted.’”86 “‘[The agency] sought to 
regulate sources it said were responsible for 86 percent of all the 
greenhouse gases emitted from stationary sources nationwide’”87—
namely, those sources whose greenhouse gas emissions exceed the 
Tailoring Rule’s modified triggering thresholds. Majority A stripped 
the agency of that authority by striking down the Tailoring Rule. But 
Majority B came to the agency’s rescue, upholding the agency’s 
authority “to regulate sources responsible for 83 percent of those 
emissions’”88—namely, those “anyway sources” whose emissions of 
more conventional pollutants already obligate them to comply with 
PSD permitting requirements.89 
A close reading of the agency’s Tailoring Rule suggests that it 
would have been more accurate for the Court to assert that EPA 
sought to regulate sources responsible for 86 percent of the 
greenhouse gas emissions from “major” stationary sources, while 
under the Court’s opinion, the agency remains able to regulate 83 
percent of those emissions.90 Even with that correction, however, it 
 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Robert Barnes, Supreme Court: EPA Can Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions, with 
Some Limits, WASH. POST, June 23, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-
court-limits-epas-ability-to-regulate-greenhouse-gas-emissions/2014/06/23/c56fc194-f1b1-11e3-
914c-1fbd0614e2d4_story.html (quoting Justice Scalia’s bench statement). 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  The Court also mentions the 83 percent estimates in its opinion. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 
2438–39 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (No. 12-1146) 
(“The Solicitor General . . . informs us that ‘anyway’ sources account for roughly 83% of 
American stationary-source greenhouse-gas emissions, compared to just 3% for the additional, 
non-“anyway” sources EPA sought to regulate at Steps 2 and 3 of the Tailoring Rule.”). 
 90.  It is difficult to pin down the original source of the 86 percent and 83 percent figures, 
but they seem to derive from EPA’s Tailoring Rule, in which the agency asserted that “anyway 
sources” “account for approximately 65 percent of total national stationary source GHG 
emissions,” while sources covered by the adjusted triggering thresholds of the first two phases of 
the Tailoring Rule would “account for approximately 67 percent of total national stationary 
source GHG emissions.” 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,568, 31571. Sources covered by the statutory 
triggering thresholds account for 78 percent of total national stationary source GHG emissions. 
75 Fed. Reg. at 31,600 (indicating that sources included under the statutory triggering thresholds 
but excluded under the adjusted thresholds of the first two phases of the rule “comprise only 11 
percent of total stationary source GHG emissions”). That leaves fully 22 percent of stationary 
source GHG emissions unregulated under even the statutory triggering thresholds. Using these 
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remains true that EPA is now able to regulate almost91 “97% of the 
[greenhouse gas] emissions the [a]gency had proposed to control 
under the . . . Tailoring Rule.”92 This plainly amounts to a significant 
victory for an agency whose authority to regulate greenhouse gases 
from either mobile or stationary sources was in doubt as recently as 
2007.93 
III.  BUT A SIGNIFICANT LOSS FOR THE COURT AND A BLOW TO 
AGENCY DEFERENCE 
It would be wrong, however, to view the opinion as a true “win” 
for EPA, because Majority A’s statutory analysis suggests that those 
five Justices have a cramped view of familiar deference doctrines. 
Moreover, the opinion is analytically muddled and takes several steps 
that run afoul of traditional notions of judicial restraint. Thus, while I 
welcome the UARG holding, the opinion itself is cause for concern 
rather than jubilation. 
The following discussion identifies flaws in each section of the 
opinion, labeled to assist the reader in cross-referencing with the 
descriptions provided above. 
A.  Part II-A-1 
The opinion brings further confusion to debates over techniques 
of statutory interpretation. As noted above, the central statutory issue 
in the case concerned the proper interpretation of the PSD triggering 
language in the Clean Air Act. After careful analysis of that language, 
the D.C. Circuit had concluded that the Act unambiguously extends 
PSD coverage to major emitters of greenhouse gases (or of any other 
pollutants already regulated under other Clean Air Act programs).94 
The lower court reached that interpretation in part because Congress 
used the word “any” in defining which stationary sources must obtain 
PSD permits: new or modified stationary sources “which emit, or have 
 
figures, one can calculate that in the first two phases of the Tailoring Rule, EPA sought to 
regulate sources responsible for (67/78) or 86 percent of the national stationary source GHG 
emissions that could potentially be covered under the PSD Program, while under the Court’s 
opinion, the agency remains able to regulate (65/78) or 83 percent of those emissions. 
 91.  That is, (0.83/0.86) or 96.5 percent.  
 92.  Matthew R. Oakes, Questioning the Use of Structure to Interpret Statutory Intent: A 
Critique of Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 124 YALE L.J. F. 56, 56–57 (2014), available at 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/OakesForum_8i6dupxe.pdf. 
 93.  That is, prior to the issuance of Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 94.  Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 134 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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the potential to emit” either 250 or 100 tons per year of “any air 
pollutant.”95 “On its face,” the D.C. Circuit explained, “the word ‘any’ 
has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of 
whatever kind,’ . . . Congress’s use of the broad, indiscriminate 
modifier ‘any’ thus strongly suggests that the phrase ‘any air pollutant’ 
encompasses greenhouse gases.”96 
Given that Justice Scalia regularly emphasizes the importance of 
focusing on statutory text,97 and other members of Majority A are also 
committed textualists,98 Majority A might have been expected 
likewise to wrestle with the meaning of the word “any” in the phrase 
“any air pollutant.” Instead, the first half of the UARG opinion 
focuses not on the PSD triggering language but on other indicia of 
statutory meaning. For example, Majority A observed that other 
portions of the Act use the term “‘air pollutant’ where what is meant 
is obviously narrower than the Act-wide definition,” and further, that 
EPA itself applies a narrowed definition of “any air pollutant” in 
administering some air pollution control programs.99 From these few 
atextual indicia, the Court concluded that the statute does not 
unambiguously compel a greenhouse gas-inclusive interpretation.100 
That is, the Act allows for the possibility that EPA could employ some 
limiting principle—as yet undetermined101—to restrict the reach of the 
PSD Program to “pollutants emitted in quantities that enable them to 
be sensibly regulated at the statutory thresholds.”102 
 
 
 95.  42 U.S.C.A. § 7479(1) (West 2014) (emphasis added). 
 96.  Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 134 (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 
520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 97 
(1976))). 
 97.  See, e.g., Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 559 
U.S. 280, 302 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (observing that 
statutory text is “the only remnant of ‘history’ that bears the unanimous endorsement of the 
majority in each House”); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 9–10 (2012) (discussing Justice Scalia’s view that judges 
must be tightly constrained by text or they will read their own values into congressional 
enactments). 
 98.  See, e.g., Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1887 
(2008) (“[I]t appears that several Justices—clearly Justices Scalia and Thomas, and perhaps 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Kennedy . . . now consider themselves 
textualists.”); id. at 1887 n.14 (collecting cites to support this proposition). 
 99.  UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2440–41. 
 100.  See id. at 2439. 
 101.  Id. at 2442 n.6 (“During the course of this litigation, several possible limiting 
constructions for the PSD trigger have been proposed. . . . We do not foreclose EPA or the 
courts from considering those constructions in the future, but we need not do so today.”). 
 102.  Id. at 2442. 
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The determination that the Clean Air Act language does not 
unambiguously require a fully greenhouse gas-inclusive interpretation 
may well be the soundest purposivist reading of the statutory 
language defining that Program. After all, as EPA itself acknowledges, 
applying the literal terms of the PSD triggering provisions to all 
greenhouse gas sources that meet the statutory definition of “major” 
would produce “a volume of permit applications” so high that the 
“permitting processes would become overwhelmed and essentially 
paralyzed.”103 The Program must be limited in its application to 
greenhouse gases if is to function at all. Yet it is striking that the 
committed textualists in Majority A reached this outcome in spite of, 
rather than because of, the statutory text. Indeed, Justice Scalia 
effectively acknowledged as much when he concluded his Chevron 
step one interpretation of the PSD triggering language by citing FDA 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation,104 arguably the most 
atextual of the Court’s past opinions.105 
B.  Part II-A-2 
Majority A did offer a plausible explanation for its choice to 
abandon the Clean Air Act’s text: that text is “not conducive to 
clarity,” and is “far from a chef d’oeuvre of legislative 
draftsmanship.”106 The opinion’s next analytic moves, however, are less 
readily explained. 
Having concluded at Chevron step one that despite its express 
language, the Clean Air Act does not compel EPA to regulate “any” 
air pollutant under the PSD Program, Majority A then decided (at 
Chevron step two) that the Act also precludes application of the full 
PSD Program to all major stationary sources of greenhouse gases. 
This portion of the Court’s analysis is deeply flawed because the 
Court adopted a questionable interpretive presumption—in effect, 
almost a plain-statement rule—under which Congress must “speak 
clearly” if it intends to delegate expansive authority to an agency to 
 
 103.  Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
74 Fed. Reg. 55,292 (Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, and 71). 
 104.  529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000). See also UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014). 
 105.  See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 
SUP. CT. REV. 223, 225–26 & n.24 (describing Brown & Williamson as “extraordinary,” and—if 
“viewed as a straightforward matter of statutory interpretation”—“puzzling,” “an idiosyncratic 
departure from the Court's usual assumptions,” and “an aberrational abandonment of 
textualism”). 
 106.  UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2441 (emphasis in original). 
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issue expensive regulations: 
EPA’s [greenhouse gas-inclusive] interpretation is also 
unreasonable because it would bring about an enormous and 
transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without 
clear congressional authorization. When an agency claims to 
discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate 
“a significant portion of the American economy,” . . . we typically 
greet its announcement with a measure of skepticism. We expect 
Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency 
decisions of vast “economic and political significance.”107 
This newfound skepticism for broad delegations of power is quite 
troubling, as there is no objective measure whereby courts can 
identify overly expansive delegations. Numerous statutory programs 
require agencies to promulgate expansive and expensive regulations; 
are all such programs now suspect? Moreover, no such plain-
statement rule previously existed. Indeed the presumption has always 
been the reverse: agency authority is at its apex when statutory 
language is ambiguous, not when it is plain. The UARG Court’s 
alternative formulation means that judicial authority is at its apex 
when statutory language is ambiguous, because it is now up to the 
courts to decide, one statutory program at a time, whether a particular 
delegation to an agency is too expansive or too expensive, and in turn, 
whether Congress’s delegation of the relevant authority is sufficiently 
clear to satisfy the UARG presumption. 
The Brown & Williamson Court wrestled with similar concerns 
about overly expansive delegation, but in that opinion the Court was 
more careful to ensure that its holding would not swallow the 
background principle of deference to agency expertise. That case 
concerned the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) effort to assert 
regulatory authority over tobacco products. The Court declined to 
defer to FDA’s “expansive construction” of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, which would enable the agency to wield too much 
power over “an industry constituting a significant portion of the 
American economy.”108 Instead, the Court determined, “based on the 
[Act’s] overall regulatory scheme and the subsequent tobacco 
legislation, that Congress ha[d] directly spoken to the question at 
issue and precluded the FDA from regulating” such products.109 In 
 
 107.  Id. at 2444 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159) (emphasis added). 
 108.  Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159. 
 109.  Id. at 160–61. 
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other words, the Brown & Williamson majority quite deliberately 
confined itself to a Chevron step one analysis. In its view, Congress’s 
intent was clear: there was no delegation to the FDA to regulate 
tobacco products. 
In contrast, in UARG, the Court undertook its 
expensive/expansive analysis at step two of Chevron, having already 
concluded at step one that the relevant Clean Air Act language is 
ambiguous. This distinction between UARG and Brown & Williamson 
may seem to be little more than a technicality, but in fact it is highly 
significant. A court’s inquiry is meant to be de novo and searching at 
step one but highly deferential at step two. Majority A’s willingness to 
import concerns about the expansiveness and expensiveness of 
Congress’s delegation into the deferential step-two analysis suggests 
that Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito may no longer be satisfied by any reasonable agency reading of 
ambiguous statutory language. Instead, Majority A seems to indicate 
that even once a court has determined that congressional intent is 
ambiguous, the court should define for itself the plausible limits of 
Congress’s delegation—presumably by consulting the judges’ own 
views of the appropriate cost and scope of executive action. In this 
cramped view of Chevron deference, courts would defer to agencies’ 
superior expertise only when (1) congressional intent is ambiguous, 
(2) the delegation does not offend the court’s sense of the proper 
scope of agency authority, and (3) the agency’s action is reasonable 
within that judicially—rather than legislatively—delimited scope. 
C.  Parts II-A-3 and II-B-2 
Finally, the last two significant parts of the UARG opinion, 
striking down the Tailoring Rule and then upholding application of 
the PSD Program to “anyway” sources, raise their own set of 
concerns. 
First, although its interpretation of the PSD triggering language 
effectively released the agency from the statutory bind that made the 
Tailoring Rule necessary, Majority A nevertheless went ahead with its 
review (and rejection) of that Rule. EPA explained at length in the 
Tailoring Rule preamble that the agency chose to adopt modified 
triggering thresholds because “the costs to sources and administrative 
burdens to permitting authorities that would result from application 
of the PSD [Program] at the statutory levels” would lead to “‘absurd 
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results.’’’110 The agency concluded that Congress “could not have 
intended that the PSD . . . threshold levels . . . apply literally” to 
stationary sources of greenhouse gases,111 and the agency “[t]herefore” 
temporarily “tailored” those thresholds. 
The Court’s determination that the Clean Air Act does not compel 
application of the PSD Program to all major stationary sources of 
greenhouse gases effectively rendered the Tailoring Rule unnecessary 
and opened up the possibility that EPA could identify some other, less 
legally-vulnerable principle to limit the Program’s reach.112 Separation 
of powers principles would suggest that the proper outcome at that 
point was a remand from the inexpert and unaccountable court to the 
more detail-oriented, expert, and democratically-accountable 
agency:113 “EPA, your awkward approach in the Tailoring Rule is no 
longer necessary; go back to the drawing boards and identify a more 
defensible limiting principle to improve the function of the PSD 
Program.” 
Yet the Court declined to take that more cautious—and more 
respectful—approach. Instead, in Part II-A-3, Majority A reviewed 
the (now unnecessary) Tailoring Rule114 and struck it down; and in 
Part II-B-2, Majority B proceeded to assess—and, indeed, enshrine as 
mandated by the Clean Air Act115—the alternative approach, 
 
 110.  Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,517 (June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, and 71). 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  The Court effectively acknowledged that point when it reassured the agency that its 
opinion does not “foreclose EPA . . . from considering . . . possible limiting constructions for the 
PSD trigger . . . in the future.” UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2442 n.6. 
 113.  For Example: 
Compared with judicial lawmaking, agency lawmaking has much to recommend it. 
First, it can make the rule of law more predictable: agencies can flesh out statutory 
standards with detailed rulemaking, and their rules have immediate national 
application, unlike the slower process of circuit-by-circuit adjudication by federal 
courts. Second, agencies have access to experts and deep experience in applying the 
statutes they are charged with enforcing. Hence, they often make better policy choices 
than either judges or legislators. For me, agencies are particularly attractive, because 
they can update statutes more rapidly and often more effectively than judges can. 
Third, agencies are typically more democratically accountable than judges. Their 
dynamic applications of statutes are subject to congressional oversight and budget 
pressures and are thus more likely to reflect current legislative preferences than 
judicial dynamism. 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2057 (2006) (reviewing 
ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006)). 
 114.  See UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444–46. 
 115.  See id. at 2448 (describing the pollution control language of the PSD Program as 
“clear” and not “readily susceptible [of] misinterpretation,” and concluding that nothing in the 
Act “suggest[s] that the BACT provision can bear a narrowing construction”). 
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suggested not in any agency rule but in the agency’s merits brief,116 of 
requiring that “anyway sources” already in the PSD Program 
undertake measures to control not just their emissions of 
conventional pollutants but also their greenhouse gas emissions.117 In 
short, rather than simply assisting EPA out of its legislative bind and 
then leaving the agency to conduct a rulemaking and devise an 
appropriate PSD limiting principle, the Court first struck down the 
Tailoring Rule and then began the process of devising a judicial 
alternative. 
Worse, in reviewing and striking down the Tailoring Rule, Majority 
A squarely answered a question on which the Court had denied 
certiorari: whether the Tailoring Rule was lawful.118  Several parties 
had pressed the Court to entertain that question,119 but the Court 
declined, instead fashioning its own, far narrower Question Presented. 
Relying on that narrow grant of certiorari, the Respondents’ brief did 
not address the lawfulness of the Tailoring Rule.120 Yet the Court took 
on the issue—and resolved it in favor of Petitioners—without the 
benefit of Respondents’ arguments. 
 
 
 116.  Federal Opposition Brief, supra note 62, at 24–28 (arguing that “the PSD program’s 
substantive requirements . . . apply to greenhouse-gas emissions from stationary sources that are 
covered by the program, including sources that are subject to the program because of their non-
greenhouse-gas . . . emissions”). 
 117.  See UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2448–49. 
 118.  In fact, answering this question also forced the Court to resolve, if not satisfactorily 
address, a second question on which it had denied certiorari: Whether the Petitioners had 
standing to challenge the Tailoring Rule in the first place. See generally, e.g., Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 88–89 (1998) (Scalia, J.) (noting that standing is 
“normally . . . considered a threshold question” that implicates the Court’s “jurisdiction to 
entertain” the suit and therefore “must be resolved in respondent's favor before proceeding to 
the merits”). 
In UARG, the Court did not bother with a true standing analysis, instead reasoning its way 
as follows: “Since the Court of Appeals thought the statute unambiguously made greenhouse 
gases capable of triggering PSD and Title V, it held that petitioners lacked Article III standing 
to challenge the Tailoring Rule because that rule did not injure petitioners but merely relaxed 
the pre-existing statutory requirements. Because we, however, hold that EPA’s greenhouse-gas-
inclusive interpretation of the triggers was not compelled, and because EPA has essentially 
admitted that its interpretation would be unreasonable without ‘tailoring,’ we consider the 
validity of the Tailoring Rule.” UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2445. 
 119.  See supra note 60 and accompanying text.  
 120.  Federal Opposition Brief at 17 supra note 62, at 1, 7& nn.4, 9 (mentioning the 
Tailoring Rule only three times, in the background section of the brief). The brief also bypassed 
Petitioners’ standing to challenge that Rule. Id. at 20 (mentioning standing only once, in a 
description of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion). 
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CONCLUSION 
Complicated statutory and regulatory tangles like the one in 
UARG pose a real challenge for courts. They must work to 
understand Congress’s purposes, the agency’s role, and the facts on 
the ground; to predict the consequences of any judicial or 
administrative intervention in the status quo; to pay adequate heed to 
interpretive rules and deference doctrines; and to draft an opinion 
that satisfies a majority of the judges hearing the case. These myriad 
challenges go a long way toward explaining the UARG Court’s 
evident confusion and frustration, and the somewhat tortured nature 
of the resulting opinion. 
The right solution in the face of such statutory and regulatory 
complexity, however, is not for the Court to muddle through, leaving 
confusion and jurisprudential detritus in their wake, but to hew 
closely to traditional deference principles. Here, having solved EPA’s 
statutory conundrum by decoupling the Tailpipe and PSD Programs, 
the Court should have remanded for EPA to sort out the resulting 
mess and adopt a workable solution. Even if EPA had adopted the 
same approach that Majority B identified—regulation of greenhouse 
emissions from “anyway” sources—that approach would have had 
greater substantive, procedural, and democratic legitimacy had it been 
developed in the first instance in a public rulemaking. 
 
